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ABSTRACT. A corporate director, sued in her individual capacity in connection with
corporate malfeasance, often seeks to raise the defense that she relied on the advice of the
corporation's counsel that the proposed course of conduct was legal. A litigation impasse may
arise, however, if the corporation, as sole holder of the attorney-client privilege, refuses to waive
its privilege. The impasse leaves the plaintiff unable to evaluate the director's claims and leaves
the defendant unable to mount her defense. As a solution to this impasse, this Note proposes
that directors and their corporations should contract ex ante that the corporation will waive its
privilege under these limited circumstances.
A U T H O R. Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2007; Yale College, B.A. 1996. I would like to
thank Professor Ian Ayres and Eugene Nardelli for their tireless assistance in developing and
editing this Note, as well as Professor John Langbein, Bharat Ramamurti, and Josh Hafetz. I
would also like to thank the attorneys and staff at the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central
District of California, Civil Division, and particularly Gary Plessman and Cathy Ostiller for their
inspiration, mentoring, and support.
412
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
NOTE CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 414
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 417
A. The Advice of Counsel Defense 418
1. Use of the Defense in Practice 418
2. The Doctrinal Nature of the Defense 420
B. The Impasse 422
C. Current Federal and State Jurisprudence 423
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 428
A. The Impasse as Agency Cost 428
B. Ex Post Solutions 431
1. Piercing the Privilege 431
2. Motion in Limine 432
3. Doctrinal Solutions: The Constitutional Right to a Defense 434
C. Ex Ante Solutions 437
1. Multiple Clients or Multiple Lawyers 437
2. Contracting for Waiver of Privilege 439
III. CONTRACTING SOLUTIONS IN DEPTH 440
A. Are Contractual Waivers of Privilege Enforceable? 440
B. The Corporation's Incentives 443
C. Default and Mandatory Rules 445
1. Default Rules 446
2. Mandatory Rules 448
D. The Terms of the Agreement 450
CONCLUSION 453
413
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
INTRODUCTION
The succession of shocking corporate scandals since 2002, coupled with
increased scrutiny from Congress, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has increased public interest in
holding corporate directors and executives personally liable for corporate
malfeasance.1 The DOJ may initiate a suit as a prosecutor for criminal fraud or
as a civil plaintiff under the False Claims Act, 2 and since 2002, the number of
federal civil fraud charges has increased by as much as 3o%.3 The Office of the
Attorney General created the Corporate Fraud Task Force (CFTF) in July 2002
to prosecute criminal corporate malfeasance and to "restore confidence to the
marketplace."4 By late 2005, the CFTF reported that since its inception it had
secured over 700 corporate fraud convictions, including convictions of more
than ioo corporate CEOs and presidents, 8o vice presidents, and 30 CFOs.'
When a corporate director finds herself under investigation for fraud for
corporate actions that she approved or implemented, 6 one defense she may
1. See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff, Year in Review: Annus Horribilis; Corporate Scandals, Lingering
Recession Made 2002 Truly Horrible Year, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 29, 2002, at Gi; OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N,
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: A RESOURCE FOR HEALTH CARE
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 1 (2003), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/
o4 o2o3CorpRespRsceGuide.pdf [hereinafter CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY] ("Personal
liability for directors, including removal, civil damages, and tax liability, as well as damage
to reputation, appears not so far from reality as once widely believed.").
2. 31 U.S.C. 5§ 3729-3733 (2000). The Act creates civil liability, including penalties and treble
damages, for any person who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or
fraudulent invoice or bill for payment or approval. Id. § 3729(a). While this Act enables the
government to file civil charges, the government may also bring criminal charges against
parties suspected of fraud. This Note therefore refers to the government as either plaintiff or
prosecutor and considers the solutions analyzed herein in both the criminal and civil
contexts.
3. Ross Kerber, Whistle-Blowers' Spotlight Falls on Drug Companies, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22,
2005, at C1.
4. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Corporate Fraud Task Force (Aug. 29, 2005),
http ://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2oo5/August/o5opa-434.htm.
5. Id. The press release highlighted that cases had proceeded against both corporations and
individual directors such as Bernard Ebbers of WorldCom and John Rigas ofAdelphia. Id.
6. This Note focuses on civil and criminal fraud actions because they present a particularly
vivid illustration of the many interests at stake in these cases and of the core legal doctrines
implicated. Fraud can give rise to parallel civil and criminal trials and can involve the federal
government as plaintiff or prosecutor, thus implicating the American public as stakeholders
in the outcome. However, the solutions outlined in this Note may also apply to other
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wish to raise is her good faith reliance on the advice of the corporation's
counsel that the actions were legal. 7 Generally, when a defendant raises this
"advice of counsel defense," the court requires her to waive the attorney-client
privilege with respect to the legal opinions upon which she relied. However,
the corporate director who hopes to raise this defense faces a unique challenge:
she is not actually the holder of the attorney-client privilege, because the
corporation was the client who retained the counsel's services. Although society
expects and even requires directors to rely on the legal advice of their
corporation's counsel, 8 courts have consistently held that the corporation is the
sole holder of the attorney-client privilege9 because to hold otherwise would
eviscerate the privilege.10 Therefore, if a director, sued in her individual
capacity, wishes to raise an advice of counsel defense and the corporation
refuses to waive its privilege, the legal system reaches an impasse in which two
fundamental doctrines are at loggerheads: the defendant director's right to
defend herself and the corporation's right to maintain its attorney-client
privilege.
This Note examines possible solutions to this impasse and argues that the
best solution is to encourage directors and corporations to contract ex ante: the
corporation will waive its attorney-client privilege if the director, sued in her
individual capacity, needs to raise an advice of counsel defense. The default
privilege rule should hold all attorney-corporation communications to be
presumptively privileged by the corporation; in other words, the default
should preserve the current law on establishing attorney-client privilege."
situations in which directors are sued in their individual capacities, such as suits for
violation of other federal regulations or shareholder derivative suits.
7. See infra Subsection I.A.1 for a hypothetical scenario demonstrating how the advice of
counsel may operate in practice.
8. See CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note i, at 2 ("Directors are not required to know
everything about a topic they are asked to consider. They may, where justified, rely on the
advice of management and of outside advisors."); infra Section I.B.
9. E.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985); United
States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a former employee's
disclosures of the corporation's attorney-client communications "could not and did not
waive the privilege"); Bushnell v. VIS Corp., No. C-95-o4256, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22572,
at *25 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1996) (holding that the former president and CEO of a
corporation has no power to waive the attorney-client privileges that his corporation has the
ability to assert).
ia. See Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 268, 278, 279 & n.6 (N.D. Il. 2004); cf. Ross v.
City of Memphis, 423 F. 3d 596, 603-04 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a former city employee
may not waive the city's attorney-client privilege to raise an advice of counsel defense).
11. Courts have formulated a number of criteria to determine which communications are in fact
privileged. For these purposes, this Note will describe communications to be "presumptively
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When the parties have contracted for waiver of the privilege, however, courts
should enforce such contracts. Furthermore, courts should encourage the
director and corporation to contract for waiver by enforcing a mandatory
exclusionary rule. A plaintiff, faced with a director who threatens to raise an
advice of counsel defense without having access to the relevant legal opinions,
should be granted a motion in limine to prevent the defendant from even
mentioning at trial that she relied on the advice of counsel. 2 Consistent
application of this exclusionary rule and the motion in limine, while remaining
within the existing legal framework, would be an improvement over the
current, uncertain regime, and would allow the parties to anticipate how
litigation would proceed.
Although a plaintiff may sue both current and former directors in their
individual capacities in connection with a corporate fraud, the case of current
directors is complicated by two factors. First, fiduciary duty constrains a
current director's ability to assert defenses in litigation that are not in the
corporation's interests.'3 Second, extralegal pressures (such as the desire for a
successful ongoing business relationship) may bear on the current director's
and corporation's litigation decisions.' 4 Therefore, although much of this Note
applies to current directors, its analysis focuses on former directors and
indicates particular issues relevant to current directors as they arise. It is
important to note that my proposed solution- contractual waiver of attorney-
privileged" to the extent that they meet the otherwise applicable requirements for the
establishment of privilege. For discussions of these criteria, see EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 45-263 (4th ed. 2OO1);
and JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE 3.O1-.03, at 3-4
to -84 (1987).
12. A motion in limine can be sought before trial in criminal or civil cases, and its purpose is to
shield the jury from exposure to prejudicial inadmissible evidence. See United States v.
Komisaruk, 885 F.2d 490, 493-94, 498 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[E]vidence may be excluded
following an in limine hearing if the evidence described in the defendant's offer of proof is
insufficient as a matter of law to establish a defense."); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 5 52, at
222-25 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). Seegenerally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 5 CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 24.4 (2d ed. 1999) (describing the purpose and strategies behind the use of a
motion in limine in a criminal trial).
13. See, e.g., Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348-49 ("[T]he power to waive the corporate attorney-client
privilege rests with the corporation's management and is normally exercised by its officers
and directors. The managers, of course, must exercise the privilege in a manner consistent
with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and not of themselves
as individuals." (footnote omitted)).
14. See, e.g., Howard v. SEC, 376 F.3d 1136, 1147-49 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (indicating that a current
director was permitted by the corporation to raise and present evidence for an advice of
counsel defense in defending charges that the director personally aided and abetted
securities violations committed by his corporation).
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client privilege-can assist both former and current directors who, at the time
of litigation, have previously negotiated for such a waiver. Thus, while the
contours of the legal uncertainty that contributes to the impasse are affected by
the current/former distinction, the implementation of the solution ultimately is
not.
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the legal framework of
the advice of counsel defense in the context of corporate directors. Courts have
considered the attorney-client privilege to be among the most fundamental
testimonial privileges in the legal system. However, a party who raises the
advice of counsel defense must waive the attorney-client privilege with respect
to the opinions relied upon.s If the corporation holds the privilege and refuses
to waive, this impasse has implications for both the plaintiff and the defendant.
It creates uncertainty as to whether the defendant will be permitted to raise the
defense at all during the trial and, if so, whether the plaintiff will be unfairly
prejudiced by the inability to cross-examine the defendant on this issue. 16 Part
II analyzes this impasse as a form of agency cost and then considers two groups
of possible solutions to the problem. Ex post solutions attempt to break the
impasse at the time of litigation, while ex ante solutions anticipate the impasse
early in the relationship between the director and the corporation. Part II then
proposes that the best solution is to encourage directors and corporations to
contract ex ante to waive the corporation's privilege under limited
circumstances. Part III develops the mechanics of how such a contractual
regime would operate. Before concluding, the Note explores how parties could
contractually tailor the scope of waiver and the conditions under which waiver
would be executed.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
This Part considers how the advice of counsel defense operates in practice
and describes its doctrinal framework. The "defense" is actually a category of
evidence designed to controvert the scienter element of the plaintiffs prima
facie case. Directors are permitted, by courts and in some states by statute, to
rely on advice of counsel as a defense to scienter. However, defendants who
raise this defense are required to waive their attorney-client privilege so that
the opposing party is able to investigate and rebut the defendant's claim. The
impasse arises in part because this doctrine of required waiver assumes that the
is. See itfa note 39 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Section I.B for a complete explanation of the tactical advantages and disadvantages
to each party.
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defendant is the holder of the privilege; it does not contemplate that a third
party may be the privilege holder. Arrival at this impasse during pretrial
litigation creates a high level of uncertainty for both the plaintiff and the
defendant because it can create tactical advantages and disadvantages for each
party depending on the facts of the case.
A. The Advice of Counsel Defense
1. Use of the Defense in Practice
To understand how the advice of counsel may operate in practice, consider
the following hypothetical scenario." During an ongoing investigation, the
government is deciding whether to press civil and criminal charges against a
hospital and its former CEO. It alleges the hospital paid fees to doctors as
inducements for patient referrals, in violation of the Medicare Anti-Kickback
Act.' 8 The government is intent on charging the former CEO individually. The
CEO's lawyers tell the government that no jury would ever convict the CEO
because he relied on the advice of the hospital's counsel that the transactions,
which amounted to paying the doctors for providing medical services, would
be structured so as to avoid violating the Act.
The problem, explain the CEO's lawyers, is that the hospital refuses to
waive its attorney-client privilege, so the CEO cannot turn over copies of the
relevant legal opinions. At this point, the government faces a dilemma: is the
government's case against the CEO strong enough to take to trial, or should it
decline to file suit? The government has no idea whether the CEO really
sought and received the claimed advice, nor does it know if this advice was
reasonable. The CEO faces a dilemma of his own: if the hospital never waives
privilege, how will he be able to keep himself out ofjail?
In such scenarios, the legal community agrees that directors under
investigation regularly consider raising an advice of counsel defense. 9
However, it is difficult to discover how frequently directors actually raise the
17. This hypothetical is based loosely on the circumstances of United States v. Anderson, 85 F.
Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Kan. 1999). Because it was unsealed after trial, the case provided a rare
glimpse into a major healthcare fraud investigation. The "Anderson case," as it is commonly
known, has been widely discussed because of the government's strategy to indict the
defendants' counsel. See, e.g., Stuart M. Gerson & Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of Counsel:
Eroding Confidentiality in Federal Health Care Law, 51 ALA. L. REv. 163, 164, 189 (1999).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 132oa-7b(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
ig. E.g., Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Certifying Statements Under Section 9o6 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
Holding Corporate Executives Accountable for the Accuracy of Corporate Financial Statements, 15
FED. SENT'G REP. 257, 260 (2003); Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 17, at 204.
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advice of counsel defense in litigation. One reason is that these cases generally
settle. The fact that so few cases go to trial in turn creates even more pressure
to settle: fewer cases tried leads to fewer definitive rulings, generating more
uncertainty about what is permissible in an increasingly complex regulatory
system.2" Settlements are often kept under seal to avoid reputational damage,2 '
making them difficult to study. Also, settlement agreements often contain a
statement that the defendants do not admit liability or guilt, and even those in
which guilt is admitted do not discuss the defenses raised by the directors. 2
it is also difficult to assess how frequently the defense is advanced because
defendants in any litigation often strategically attempt to exhaust all other
defenses before raising the advice of counsel defense, as it implies a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege. 3 Therefore, of cases that do go to trial, many will
not indicate that an advice of counsel defense was raised, though the defense
may have considered raising it or even threatened to do so in an earlier
settlement negotiation. 4
2o. Cf Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 17, at 173.
21. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study qf Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 532 (1991).
22. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement Between the Office of Inspector General of the Department
of Health and Human Services and Robert A. Berkman, M.D., United States v. Berkman,
No. 1:o3-cr-ooo 4 5 -JJF-ALL (D. Del. July 17, 2003), available at
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/Robert%2oA%2oBerkman%2oMD%2007%2
o17%2o2003.pdf (admitting guilt but omitting any discussion of defense theories); Press
Release, SEC, SEC Settles Civil Fraud Charges Filed Against Kevin P. Hannon, Former
Chief Operating Officer of Enron Broadband Services (Aug. 31, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/1itigation/Iitreleases/Ir18862.htm (describing a settlement in which the
defendant settled "without admitting or denying" the allegations against him, and omitting
any discussion of the defendant's defense theories).
23. See generally Alan J. Martin et al., Putting Attorneys on the Witness Stand and Their Advice at
Issue: The Perils of Selective Waiver of Privilege, in ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CMIL
LITIGATION: PROTECTING AND DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY 329 (Vincent S. Walkowiak ed.,
3d ed. 2004) (advising lawyers to avoid claims, such as the advice of counsel defense, that
require a waiver of the attorney-client privilege).
24. In a study of published healthcare fraud opinions from 1995 to 1998, Gerson and Gladieux
found that the advice of counsel defense was raised only about 1% of the time. Gerson &
Gladieux, supra note 17, at 199 tbl. 3 . As the authors noted, the study excluded "all
unpublished opinions, cases not recommended for full-text publication . .. decisions
without published opinions," and "the far larger number of cases that are never decided
because they are settled." Id. at 197.
419
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
2. The Doctrinal Nature of the Defense
The argument that a defendant should not be held liable because she relied
in good faith on the advice of her lawyer is a means of establishing good faith
and negating scienter.25 Courts generally state that reliance on advice of counsel
is not a separate and affirmative defense, but rather a circumstance indicating
good faith, which the trier of fact may consider on the question of fraudulent
intent.26 The advice of counsel defense therefore has the practical effect of a
"complete defense" to actions for which scienter is required, such as knowingly
submitting an inflated healthcare bill for Medicare reimbursement.2 7 In such
actions, a defendant's proof that she relied in good faith on her lawyer's advice
relieves her of liability because it rebuts one of the elements of the plaintiffs
case. However, in actions that do not include an element of scienter, such as an
action for illegal payment28 or unjust enrichment, the defendant cannot avail
herself of the defense.2 9
Courts distinguish the advice of counsel defense from true affirmative
defenses. An affirmative defense would absolve a defendant of liability even in
the face of clear evidence that all elements of the charge, including the requisite
25. Alternatively, the action of seeking legal advice in and of itself can demonstrate that the
defendant met the standard of due care in undertaking the conduct at issue. See Note,
Reliance on Advice of Counsel, 70 YALE L.J. 978, 979, 986-87 (1961).
26. See United States v. Ibarra-Alcarez, 83o F.2d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the advice
of counsel defense in a currency smuggling case); United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869,
876 (9th Cir. 198o) (tax evasion); Bisno v. United States, 299 F.2d 711, 719-20 (9th Cir.
1961) (bankruptcy fraud).
27. United States v. Faust, 850 F.2d 575, 582 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding in a mail fraud case that
"[g]ood faith, in general, constitutes a complete defense to any crime which requires
fraudulent intent"); see Bisno, 299 F.2d at 720; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 29(l) (2000) ("When a client's intent or mental state is in issue, a
tribunal may consider otherwise admissible evidence of a lawyer's advice to the client.").
z8. The doctrine of illegal payment holds that payment of public monies by public officers
under mistake of fact or law can be recovered by the public entity. See, e.g., J.W. Bateson Co.
v. United States, 308 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1962).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249-52 (1985) (holding that advice of counsel
may be a viable defense when a taxpayer relies on counsel's advice as to a matter of law, but
that advice of counsel is no defense when a taxpayer violates a statute that imposes strict
liability-for example, if he fails to file in a timely manner); Szumigala v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 853 F.2d 274, 279-82 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that an advice of counsel defense will
lie in a tort action for bad faith insurance defense denial, but not in an action for breach of
contract); James M. Fischer, Should Advice of Counsel Constitute a Defense for Insurer Bad
Faith?, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1447, 1464-67 (1994); G. Van Ingen, Annotation, Reliance on Attorney,
Accountant, or Other Expert in Preparing Income Tax Returns as Defense Against Fraud Penalties,
22 A.L.R.2d 972 (1952).
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mental state, were present. For example, if a defendant in an action for which
scienter is a required element raises a statute of limitations defense and the
statute has run, she will prevail even if there is clear evidence that she
committed the act with actual knowledge. Procedurally, then, the advice of
counsel defense is not an affirmative defense, but rather a "negative defense"
presented to controvert the plaintiffs case.30 The burden of production falls on
the defendant, as she has raised the defense,' but the burden of persuasion
remains with the plaintiff; the defense may use evidence of reliance on advice
of counsel merely as a means to weaken the plaintiffs case.
Courts have assumed that a corporate director may rely on an advice of
counsel defense even when the advice was sought on behalf of her
corporation," and some states, including Delaware, have endorsed such
reliance by statute.33 At first glance, this assumption seems logical, as a
corporation may only advise itself through the listening ears of its directors.
3 4
However, this assumption overlooks the fact that the client seeking advice is
not the director in her individual capacity but the corporation. It is difficult to
know what a particular director actually hears when listening to corporate
counsel's advice. She may believe that corporate counsel's advice is equally
30. See United States v. Komisaruk, 885 F.2d 490, 495 ( 9 th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing, in a
criminal case, between evidence provided to prove an affirmative defense, such as
justification or necessity, and evidence provided as a "negative defense" to negate the mens
rea elements of the crime); Marino v. Otis Eng'g Corp., 839 F.2d 1404, 1408 (oth Cir. 1988)
(holding that there is a difference between evidence in support of an affirmative defense and
evidence that negates the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint, and that a court may
permit the defendant to introduce the same evidence for one purpose but not the other).
31. Cf Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980) (holding that the burden of pleading a
negative defense falls on the defendant, as the defendant is more likely to be able to produce
the information relevant to that defense).
32. E.g., United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3 d 823, 830-32 (loth Cir. 2000) (holding that if the
jury had believed that the defendant had relied in good faith on the advice of corporate
counsel, he would have been entitled to an acquittal); Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241, 247 (2d
Cir. 1956) (upholding the validity of the advice of counsel defense asserted by former
corporate directors, but not discussing the fact that the counsel represented the company
and not the directors individually); Douglas W. Hawes & Thomas J. Sherrard, Reliance on
Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1, 28 (1976).
33. E.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, S 141(e) (2001) ("A member of the board of directors ... shall,
in the performance of such member's duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon
•.. opinions, reports or statements presented to the corporation by ... any other person as
to matters the member reasonably believes are within such other person's professional or
expert competence .. "); see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(e) (2002).
34. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) ("As an
inanimate entity, a corporation must act through agents. A corporation cannot speak
directly to its lawyers.").
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applicable to herself and to the corporation when in fact there could be
different legal implications for the corporation than for herself if she is sued
individually.
Despite this potential divergence of interests, courts and legislators are
correct in allowing directors to rely on counsel's advice as a defense when
liability depends on scienter. The success of the defense depends on proving
that the defendant had a good faith belief that her actions were legal. Whether
counsel's opinion gave the defendant such a good faith belief does not depend
on the precise relationship between the defendant and counsel. Any evidence




The Supreme Court has steadfastly guarded the attorney-client privilege,
considering it fundamental to the successful functioning of the justice system.
The landmark case on attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting is
Upjohn Co. v. United States, in which the Court stated that "[t]he attorney-
client privilege is the oldest of the recognized privileges for confidential
communications. '', 6 The privilege is intended "to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of
justice. '37 Today, the Court continues to maintain that any narrowing of the
scope of the attorney-client privilege could significantly frustrate its purpose.
In one recent case, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the Court held that
attorney-client communications remained privileged even after the client's
death. 
8
Notwithstanding this strong presumption against narrowing the scope of
attorney-client privilege, courts generally require a defendant who raises an
advice of counsel defense to waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to
those documents or conversations relied upon.3 9 Notably, this doctrine of
35. Cf. Gregory E. Maggs, Consumer Bankruptcy Fraud and the "Reliance on Advice of Counsel"
Argument, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1995) (arguing that in the context of bankruptcy
fraud, any advice that negates the defendant's scienter should be considered, even if the
lawyer was not the defendant's own).
36. 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
37. Id.
38. 524 U.S. 399, 403,411 (1998) (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389).
39. See, e.g., Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 718-21 (9th Cir. 2003) (containing an extensive
discussion of implied waiver of attorney-client privilege when placing advice of counsel at
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required waiver assumes that the defendant is the holder of the privilege;
current doctrine does not provide an answer for what is to happen when a third
party is the privilege holder. This assumption leads to an impasse when the
defendant director indicates she would like to raise an advice of corporate
counsel defense.
The impasse can create a tactical advantage or disadvantage for either party.
For the plaintiff, the scenario can create a disadvantage because he will be
unable to gather evidence to refute the defendant's claims. Alternatively, the
scenario can create an advantage for the plaintiff, allowing him to threaten the
defendant that she will be unable to present any convincing evidence to a jury
and may be entirely prohibited from making the assertion by a motion in
limine.40 For the defendant director, the scenario can create a disadvantage
because she may be unable to present exculpatory evidence. If the director faces
criminal charges, this could be considered an abrogation of her constitutional
right to defend herself. The scenario may, however, advantage the defendant if
she can purposefully exploit the plaintiffs inability to cross-examine her and
convince a jury that she lacked the requisite scienter. Moreover, the corporation
and the director could collude to exploit their informational advantage by
purposefully relying on the corporation's right to withhold the privilege while
the director tells the plaintiff that she desperately wants to share the legal
materials but is "unable" to do so because of the corporation's recalcitrance.4 '
C. Current Federal and State Jurisprudence
In considering how this impasse can be broken, two issues arise. The first is
whether the director has any kind of individual authority to waive the
corporation's attorney-client privilege. The second is whether, if the director
has no such authority and the corporation refuses to waive, the director may
issue in a criminal context); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F. 3d 851,
863 (3 d Cir. 1994); Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 ( 9 th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292-93 (2d Cir. 1991); Lorenz v. Valley Forge Ins.
Co., 815 F.2d 1095, 1O98 (7 th Cir. 1987). State law has also recognized this doctrine. See, e.g.,
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 730 A.2d 51, 60-63 (Conn. 1999) (providing
an extensive overview of the "at issue" doctrine with citations to many other state cases).
40. The fact that the current legal regime does not indicate which of these outcomes is more
likely would further increase the risk-averse defendant's apprehension and improve the
plaintiffs position going into settlement.
41. These tactics are examples of the proverbial "sword and shield" tactic that courts strongly
disfavor: "[T]he attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a sword. A
defendant may not use the privilege to prejudice his opponent's case or to disclose some
selected communications for self-serving purposes." Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292 (citations
omitted).
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proceed with the advice of counsel defense. There are two federal cases that
have considered these issues, and they have taken opposite positions. 42 The
two state cases on point consider only the first issue.4"
In a recent district court opinion, United States v. W.R. Grace (Grace II), 44
several directors of the corporation, charged in their individual capacities with
conspiracy to violate the Clean Air Act and to defraud the United States,4"
argued that they wanted to raise an advice of counsel defense but that Grace
was refusing to waive its privilege. 46 Acknowledging the lack of authority on
point, the court conducted its own Sixth Amendment analysis.47 It determined
that a balancing test should be used to determine when the defendants' right to
defend themselves should prevail over Grace's right to maintain its attorney-
client privilege. 48 The court also set forth the procedure by which such a test
would be accomplished. The judge would determine whether he would force a
waiver of privilege "on a document-by-document basis at trial, where the
probative value of each bit of evidence can be evaluated in the context of the
government's case and in light of what the evidence shows. '49 The defendants
were required to file notice at least two days in advance of their intent to
introduce any such communications."s
42. When the United States proceeds under the False Claims Act or any other federal statute,
federal courts will apply their own rules of privilege when state interests are not infringed.
E.g., Odmark v. Westside Bancorporation, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 552, 554 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
Federal common law governs issues of privilege. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 5O1; United States v.
Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9 th Cir. 1977).
43. State cases can be illustrative even in a discussion focused on federal law. In the absence of
clear federal common law, federal courts may look to other sources, including state law.
United States v. Ellis, 714 F.zd 953, 955 (9 th Cir. 1983).
44. 439 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Mont. 2006).
4S. The facts of the case are stated in an earlier opinion. United States v. W.R. Grace (Grace I),
233 F.R.D. S86, 587-88 (D. Mont. 2005).
46. Grace II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1129. The directors were seeking severed trials on the grounds
that, inter alia, it would be easier to effect a waiver of the corporation's privilege against its
will if the trials were separated. Id. As the court noted, the defendants' theory that
severability of the trial would have any effect on the privilege question was questionable. See
id. at 1129, 1136, 1144 n.18. However, the court felt the need to address the privilege issue on
the merits to resolve the case. Id. at 1136.
47. For an in-depth discussion of the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, see infra Subsection
II.B.3.
48. Grace 11, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
49. Id. at 1142-43.
50. Id. at 1143 n.16.
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A recent Sixth Circuit opinion, Ross v. City of Memphis,"1 reversed a district
court decision that had taken a similar approach to Grace II. Ross considered
this question in the context of a former police chief sued for Title VII
discrimination, who wished to present his good faith reliance on the city's
counsel as grounds for his qualified inmmunity defense. The Sixth Circuit held
on interlocutory appeal that the former police chief could not waive the
privilege and that no balancing test should be used. 2 Relying heavily on the
policy arguments for attorney-client privilege in Upjohn and Swidler & Berlin,
the court held that making the city's ability to maintain its attorney-client
privilege contingent on the litigation choices of a former employee 3 "renders
the privilege intolerably uncertain. 5 s4 The court did not address whether,
subsequent to this ruling, the defendant police chief would be permitted to
continue to assert the advice of counsel defense."
Ross hews closely to the general rule in corporate law that a former
employee may not waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege.56 In
51. 423 F. 3d 596 (6th Cir. 2oo5).
52. Id. at 603-04.
53. It is possible that the Ross decision depended on a unique aspect of Title VII cases against
government employees that is not present in the corporate context. Under the doctrine of
qualified immunity, government officials performing their duties are shielded from civil
damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent
with the rights they are alleged to have violated. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-
39 (1987). The Ross court stated that, in a Title VII case against a police officer, "reliance on
the advice of counsel is not usually a component of the qualified immunity defense," and so
"the defendant claiming reliance on the advice of counsel[] is not being treated unfairly. He
retains the use of a qualified immunity defense, which generally turns on the objective
reasonableness of an official's actions." 423 F. 3 d at 603-04. This language implies that the
court's decision turned in part on the fact that evidence about the defendant's subjective
state of mind was irrelevant to his defense.
54. Ross, 423 F.3d at 604.
SS. The Ross case is still unfolding. Most recently, after an unsuccessful attempt to win
summary judgment on the qualified immunity defense without raising an advice of counsel
defense, Ross v. City of Memphis, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1O24, 1041-42 (W.D. Tenn. 2005), the
defendant appears to have resumed attempts to gain access to the city counsel's advice, this
time by arguing (unsuccessfully) that he had a joint client privilege, Ross v. City of
Memphis, No. 02-2454 Mi/An, 20o6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17390, at *1-3 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 21,
2006).
56. E.g., United States v. Chen, 99 F. 3 d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a former
employee's disclosures of the corporation's attorney-client communications "could not and
did not waive the privilege"); Bushnell v. VIS Corp., No. C-95-04256 MHP, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22572, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1996) (holding that a former president and CEO of
a corporation has no power to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege). The
Bushnell court also held that a former director may not "pierce" or otherwise invade the
corporation's attorney-client privilege to inspect documents created during his tenure. 1996
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Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 7 the Supreme Court
considered whether former directors of a bankrupt corporation could assert the
corporation's attorney-client privilege against the corporation's court-
appointed trustee, who wished to waive the privilege in order to investigate
possible wrongdoing. The Court's language has become the leading statement
of this doctrine:
[W]hen control of a corporation passes to new management, the
authority to assert and waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege
passes as well. New managers installed as a result of a takeover, merger,
loss of confidence by shareholders, or simply normal succession, may
waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to communications
made by former officers and directors. Displaced managers may not
assert the privilege over the wishes of current managers, even as to
statements that the former might have made to counsel concerning
matters within the scope of their corporate duties. 
8
State jurisprudence on the impasse is also undeveloped. The California
Court of Appeal held in 2004 that displaced managers who raised an advice of
counsel defense could not waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege.5 9
Citing both Weintraub and California precedent, the court held that the
defendants in their individual capacities were not the clients of the
corporation's lawyers and therefore could not waive the corporation's attorney-
client privilege by asserting the advice of counsel defense.6o The court
addressed the plaintiffs' concern that they would be unable to evaluate or
counter the advice of counsel defense absent discovery by stating:
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22572, at *23; accord Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 268, 278
(N.D. Ill. 2004).
57. 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
58. Id. at 349; see also United States v. Plache, 913 F.2d 1375, 1381 ( 9th Cir. 199o) (holding that a
former director of a bankrupt corporation indicted for mail fraud could not assert the
corporation's attorney-client privilege over the wishes of the court-appointed receiver); In re
Boileau, 736 F.2d 503, 5o6 ( 9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a former director of a bankrupt
corporation retained no authority to assert the privilege when the court-appointed examiner
waived it).
59- Venture Law Group v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 661-63 (Ct. App. 2004).
60. Id. at 662; see also State ex rel. Lause v. Adolf, 710 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that six current and former directors sued in their personal capacities could not
waive their corporation's attorney-client privilege by attempting to raise an advice of counsel
defense).
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We understand [plaintiffs'] argument that they must be allowed to
depose [the corporation's attorney] in order to test the validity of the
advice of counsel defense and the individual defendants' credibility.
However, as this court has explained, the privilege is not vitiated by the
fact that its exercise may occasionally suppress relevant evidence. It has
been recognized that the search [for] truth must sometimes give way to
the purposes of the privilege. Thus, the privilege is not to be set aside
when one party seeks verification of the authenticity of its adversary's
position.
Although the court did not directly consider whether the defendants would
nonetheless be permitted to mention at trial that they followed the advice of
counsel, the court's language suggests they would be.62
In light of these conflicting authorities, the current law is unclear as to
whether a director may waive the corporation's privilege absent its consent
and, if not, whether the defendant can present her advice of counsel defense. In
the few cases on point, courts are split over whether they would be willing to
force any kind of unilateral waiver of the corporation's privilege. Grace II gives
some insight into the cumbersome procedure that would be used in a balancing
test regime to determine when waiver is required. Moreover, no authority that
eschews the balancing test approach has clearly indicated how the trial would
proceed if the defendant sought to mount a defense for which she could not
obtain evidence. No authority has addressed whether the defendant could be
prohibited by a motion in limine from even mentioning at trial that she relied
on advice of counsel. 6' The very uncertainty created by this lack of authority
may in turn create more pressure for parties to settle, further contributing to
the lack of published judicial guidance.6 4
61. Venture Law Group, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3 d at 662-63 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
62. Id. at 663.
63. The case law is particularly lacking on this point because, as discussed supra Subsection
I.A.1, these cases usually settle, and the settlements do not discuss the defense theories. The
few cases that have generated published opinions thus far have been pretrial motions. Of
those cases with published subsequent history, they may not have gone to trial, or the
defendant may have otherwise changed her litigation strategy to avoid the impasse. For
example, after the Sixth Circuit's decision in Ross, the defendant police officer went forward
with a qualified immunity defense and apparently dropped the advice of counsel theory.
Ross v. City of Memphis, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1o24 (W.D. Tenn. 2005). The defendants in Grace
II have not appealed the privilege ruling as of the time of this writing.
64. See supra Subsection I.A.i.
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II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
An agency cost analysis provides the best framework in which to evaluate
potential solutions to the impasse that arises when a director attempts to raise
an advice of counsel defense but the corporation refuses to waive its privilege.
This Part surveys ex post solutions, which tend to increase the costs to all
parties, and ex ante solutions, which are more effective at reducing the costs
associated with the impasse. The most effective solution would be for the
corporation and the director to contract for the corporation to waive its
attorney-client privilege if the director must raise an advice of counsel defense.
A. The Impasse as Agency Cost
The best framework for evaluating potential solutions comes from
understanding the impasse as an expression of agency costs between the
director and the shareholders.6" The agency relationship generally takes the
form of"a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.
66
Importantly, decision-making is an inherent part of what the agent has been
authorized to do. An agent does not simply execute; an agent makes decisions.
Agency costs, which reduce the value of the agency relationship, occur when
the incentives for the agent differ from the incentives for the principal; these
divergent interests may lead the agent to contribute suboptimally to the
venture as she pursues her own interests at the expense of the principal's.
In the corporate context, the director is the agent of the shareholders and,
as such, must make decisions for the corporation. Agency costs arise in the
decision-making context when the incentives of the director differ from the
incentives of the shareholders. Today, these incentives diverge because the
director faces a greater risk of liability than the corporation for deciding to take
a course of action that, in hindsight, proves to be illegal.67 Therefore, she will
65. This Note uses a simplified model of the firm and assumes that shareholders are the owners
of the firm, directors are their agents, and all executives are also directors. See Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-30 (1976) (developing the theory of the firm
using simplified organizational models and agency theory).
66. Id. at 308.
67. Risks related to the legality of a given business decision are considered to be similar, perhaps
inseparable for purposes of this discussion, to what might be termed purely "financial"
risks. Any business decision, such as the decision to approve a merger for a given price,
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be more risk averse than the shareholders would like. Because lower-risk
ventures traditionally lead to lower returns, the agency costs will lower the
value of the firm.68
Thus, the principal and agent may incur monitoring and bonding costs to
reduce agency costs-often by realigning the parties' interests-and to bring
the value of the relationship closer to its optimal level.69 In an agency cost
framework, the solution to the impasse will likely take the form of a bonding
cost. Such a bonding cost can help align the interests of the director and
shareholder so that directors take on the optimal level of risk for the
corporation and thus allow the corporation to earn the optimal level of returns.
To align the divergent interests of the parties, it is necessary to consider the
costs to each party involved. First, consider the experience of the corporation.
Agency theory predicts that directors may overinvest in positions that are
suboptimal and less aggressive to reduce the risk of personal liability when the
corporation has a valid defensive theory that the directors cannot raise. With
respect to the attorney-client privilege, the unpredictability of the current legal
regime also creates high risks for corporations in the form of litigation
uncertainty and judicial error. The possibility that a court may waive the
corporation's privilege at some unknown point in the future significantly
increases the corporation's uncertainty. Such waiver is especially costly because
once a privileged document has been released, even erroneously, it may be
difficult or impossible to reclaim privilege for that document."
implicates the law and creates a liability risk as well. See Roberta Romano, What Went
Wrong with Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 13-15, 21-24
(1989) (arguing that changes in the economic environment, changes in legal standards, and
uncertainty in legal standards all contribute equally to changes in directors' potential
liability and risk preference).
68. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE
L.J. 541, 551 (2003) ("[M]anagers sabotage shareholders either by diverting corporate wealth
to themselves or by failing to take appropriate risks on behalf of the firm."); cf. Romano,
supra note 67, at 4 (arguing that shareholders want "to ensure that directors take the desired
level of risk, as they might otherwise be too cautious for fear of the potential liability for a
decision that proves harmful with hindsight").
69. Parties do not incur bonding costs because they are "free," but because the parties believe
the costs will be an investment that results in a net reduction of agency costs and thus a net
increase in the value of the firm. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 65, at 326.
70. Errors by judges about whether to force waiver of a corporation's privilege are highly likely
given that there is little authority on this question. Moreover, once privilege has been
waived for particular documents, the privilege no longer exists, so an erroneous order by a
judge to release documents is in some sense unreviewable. The reviewability of a court's
privilege ruling is the subject of some disagreement. Martin et al., supra note 23, at 344, 350
n.1o2; see also Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F. 3 d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 2005) (comparing Sixth
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Turning to the costs borne by the defendant director, the most obvious cost
is bearing the entire risk of personal liability for each decision. Today's
directors risk jail or civil penalties not merely for choosing to do things that are
illegal, but also for conduct that would not result in liability (such as a
questionable course of action based on good faith reliance on a legal opinion) if
only the director had access to the exculpatory opinion on which she based her
decision." The director also experiences costs in the form of litigation
uncertainty due to the unpredictability of the legal regime. These costs will be
most acute during settlement negotiations, as the director who is unsure of her
access to key privileged materials may be unable to assess her chances at trial
and thus her position going into settlement.
Many costs are also externalized onto society, primarily due to the
unpredictability of the legal regime. In contrast to the individual corporation,
which is merely concerned ex post with maintaining privilege of a select set of
documents, the universe of other corporate entities suffers from ex ante
litigation uncertainty and judicial error costs -as these firms go about their
day-to-day business, they cannot be completely confident of the strength of
their attorney-client privilege. They will be unsure of how to proceed in
making complex decisions that require professional legal advice. The
noncorporate public also faces costs in government-initiated actions, which
implicate the public interest. The uncertainties and disadvantages that this
regime creates for a plaintiff trying to win a case are great, as discussed in
Section I.B. Finally, the public as taxpayer suffers high costs in the form of
unrecovered tax money that may have been fraudulently obtained.
The agency cost analysis and the identification of the costs involved suggest
that the optimal solution is the one that reduces the many costs to all parties
and also most effectively internalizes those costs that are currently externalized.
The above analysis shows that the two costs that are common to all three
parties are litigation uncertainty and risk of judicial error; the ideal solution
will be one that brings clarity and certainty to the process.
Circuit law to D.C. Circuit and Third Circuit law on the permissibility of interlocutory
appeal of discovery orders involving privilege).
pi. For example, the individual defendants in Grace II appear to have chosen a course of
conduct that was only illegal depending on the interpretation of federal environmental
regulations. They would not face liability for knowingly violating the statute if they could
prove that they believed, based on counsel's advice, that they were not violating it. Access to
the privileged legal opinions could thus be critical to the individual defendants' cases. See
Grace II, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Mont. 20o6).
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B. Ex Post Solutions
Ex post solutions attempt to break the impasse at the time of litigation. The
ex post solutions include allowing one party to unilaterally invade the
corporation's privilege, applying evidence law to simply exclude any mention
of the defendant's claim, or interpreting a defendant's right to mount a defense
as trumping the corporation's privilege. These solutions are less effective than
ex ante solutions because within their current doctrinal parameters they tend to
increase uncertainty costs. Also, they only internalize externalities in limited
cases. Attempts to utilize these solutions more effectively would require
significant changes to current legal regimes. In contrast, as I will discuss below,
a contractual solution would require little change to current law.
i. Piercing the Privilege
One solution to the impasse is to allow one party to unilaterally invade or
"pierce" the corporation's privilege. For example, the prosecution may be able
to pierce the corporation's privilege under the crime-fraud exception. This
doctrine allows a court to order waiver of a corporation's privilege when the
prosecution can make a preliminary showing that the attorney's services were
intentionally used in the service of furthering the alleged fraud.73 The doctrine
is extremely limited, however, and may be applied only when the prosecution
has evidence that the defendant intended the attorney's services to be an actual
element of the commission of the crime-for example, if the defendant's
lawyers assisted the defendant in the actual preparation of tax returns that all
parties knew were fraudulent.74 The doctrine will not apply when the
defendant merely sought the attorney's legal advice in contemplation of future
conduct that turned out to be illegal in hindsight-for example, if the
72. Many cases use the term "pierce" to describe allowing one party to access privileged
materials notwithstanding the other party's valid attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Bushnell
v. VIS Corp., No. C-9 5-o4 256 MHP, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22572, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
29, 1996) ("Bushnell cannot pierce the attorney-client or work product privileges asserted
by defendants ....").
73. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989).
74. See United States v. Chen, 99 F. 3d 1495, 1503-04 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that evidence that
the defendants' attorneys had purposefully participated in the preparation of fraudulent tax
returns was sufficient to permit the prosecution to invoke the crime-fraud exception); see
aLso United States v. Davis, 1 F. 3d 6o6, 61o (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the crime-fraud
exception applied when the defendant tricked his attorney into misrepresenting the
defendant's level of compliance with discovery orders).
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defendant sought legal advice on securities disclosure requirements to
determine the legality of conduct before taking action.75
Some courts have wrestled with allowing a defendant director to pierce the
corporation's privilege to access particular documents she viewed when she
was employed by the corporation, without allowing the defendant to
technically "waive" the corporation's privilege. 6 The majority view, however,
is that a defendant director may not pierce the corporation's privilege, even to
access documents that she may have viewed or solicited.77
Solutions that depend on allowing either the plaintiff or the defendant to
pierce the corporation's attorney-client privilege are unsatisfactory because
they would apply in very limited circumstances under current law and would
not reduce agency costs. Piercing the privilege would actually increase agency
costs due to increased litigation uncertainty and risk of judicial error. The risk
that a party's privilege could be waived unilaterally at some future point would
eviscerate the privilege. In addition to having a chilling effect on attorney-client
candor, this would increase litigation uncertainty and judicial error costs, as
parties would be unable to assess the strength of their privilege and to manage
the risk of disclosure accordingly. 78
2. Motion in Limine
Another ex post solution is to take a do-nothing approach: to apply
evidence law without special consideration for the interests at stake and to
accept the consequences of such application. One device that would likely be
employed is a motion in limine, a pretrial device that enables a party to
prohibit an opponent from presenting offending evidence at trial by seeking an
advance ruling on its admissibility.79 The motion allows the moving party to
prevent prejudicial matter that would ultimately be inadmissible from entering
75. In re Bankamerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 270 F.3d 639, 643 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he crime-fraud
exception does not apply when a publicly held company seeks legal advice concerning its
disclosure obligations and then commits an unintentional disclosure violation.").
76. See, e.g., Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 268, 277 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Finovia Capital
Corp. v. Lawrence, No. 3 -9 9-CV-25 52-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2087, at *6-7 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 22, 2001); Bushnell, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22572, at *23.
77. E.g., Bushnell, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22572, at *23; see also Dexia Credit Local, 231 F.R.D. at
278. But see Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143 F.R.D. 241, 247 (D. Colo. 1992) (holding that a former
director may pierce the corporation's attorney-client privilege to view documents he could
have viewed upon request at the time they were generated).
78. See supra Section I.B for more discussion of the costs of uncertainty in privilege law.
7g. 75AM.JUR. 2D Trial § 94 (1991).
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the record at all. 80 The policy permitting motions in limine recognizes that
merely asking an improper question in front of the jury may unfairly prejudice
the moving party even though the offending evidence is excluded at trial. 8,
Using this procedure, courts could simply grant a plaintiffs motion in limine
to prevent the defendant director who cannot secure a waiver of the
corporation's privilege from raising the advice of counsel defense at all. Or
courts could deny the motion and allow the defendant to take the stand and
make a bald, unsubstantiated claim that she relied on the advice of counsel
even though she will not be able to present any evidence to this effect.
These options leave all of the risks and costs completely in place. If the
court does grant the motion in limine, the defendant director will have to
mount a defense without what might be her critical exculpatory argument. The
defendant director will now bear all of the agency costs because she bears far
more risk of liability than the corporation. If the court permits the defendant to
take the stand and make a bald assertion, the court gives the defense an
opportunity to exploit the sympathies of the jury while giving the plaintiff no
benefit at all. In this situation, the parties face uncertainty because they must
try to predict how a jury will respond to the defendant's presentation of a legal
theory that the defense cannot support and that the plaintiff cannot discredit
through cross-examination. The agency costs are largely externalized onto the
plaintiff or prosecution, which, in civil or criminal fraud cases, is often a
representative of the public.
Current law also does not give any guidance as to which of these options is
more likely to be ordered by a court.82 This lack of guidance adds additional
litigation uncertainty costs, as it is harder to predict whether a court will grant
a motion in limine. A defendant or plaintiff, unable to predict the outcome of
the motion in limine, will have a more difficult time assessing the strength of
its position going into settlement negotiations, as well as a more difficult time
developing a litigation strategy.
A consistent approach to ruling on motions in limine would reduce the
additional agency costs associated with uncertainty as to the outcome of the
motion. The parties would at least know whether the unsubstantiated claim
go. Id.
81. Id.; see also supra note 12.
82. For example, subsequent to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Ross, the district court heard a
summary judgment motion on whether the police chief was still protected from personal
liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity, and there was no discussion of the advice of
counsel defense. Ross v. City of Memphis, 394 F. Supp. 2d io24 (W.D. Tenn. 2005). It is
impossible to tell from this opinion whether the plaintiff moved for a motion in limine to
exclude all discussion of this defense or whether the defendant simply stopped pursuing it.
433
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
would be permitted. However, as discussed above, decisions to grant or deny
both lead to an outcome that itself creates substantial uncertainty: in particular,
denying the motion in limine leaves the parties to speculate how a jury will
take unsupported and unexamined claims into account in weighing the
element of scienter. Therefore, applying evidence law with no additional legal
innovation simply begs critical questions and offers little solution to the
problems of agency costs and externalities.
3. Doctrinal Solutions: The Constitutional Right to a Defense
The most compelling ex post solution is to have a court apply a balancing
test to determine when the defendant's right to mount a defense should trump
the corporation's right to maintain its attorney-client privilege. Since 1967, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged and expanded the scope of a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to mount a defense, grounded alternatively in
the Compulsory Process Clause, s3 the Confrontation Clause, s4 and the Due
Process Clause.8 By 1987, the Court had developed a balancing test to
determine whether a particular evidentiary privilege must yield to this right:
whether the interests served by the exclusionary rule justify the limitation
imposed on the defendant's constitutional right to present exculpatory
evidence.8' However, the Court has consistently held that testimonial
privileges, which include the attorney-client privilege, need not be balanced
against the defendant's right to defend herself 87
In Swidler & Berlin, the Court proved extremely resistant to granting any
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. 8 The Court feared that a balancing
test approach, even limited to criminal cases involving a deceased defendant,
would introduce such substantial uncertainty into the privilege's application
83. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
84. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974).
85. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The right of an accused in a
criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against
the State's accusations.").
86. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987).
87. E.g., Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 n.21 ("Nothing in this opinion should be construed as
disapproving testimonial privileges ...."); accord Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295. But see Grace II,
439 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1140 (D. Mont. 2006) (holding that the Supreme Court's exclusion of
testimonial privileges in Washington did not indicate the Court's opposition to the use of
balancing tests when the attorney-client privilege was at stake, but merely acknowledged
that the issue was not before the Court).
88. 524 U.S. 399,409 (1998).
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that it would eviscerate the privilege: "A 'no harm in one more exception'
rationale could contribute to the general erosion of the privilege, without
reference to common law principles or 'reason and experience.""" Indeed,
under a balancing test regime, a court may decide during some future litigation
that a privilege must be pierced, meaning that the corporation ultimately has
no reliable privilege. A corporation cannot have frank and open
communications with counsel if it understands that a future defendant's need
to reveal privileged information may persuade a court to pierce its attorney-
client privilege."0 This concern was central to the reasoning in the recent Ross
case. 9' Criticizing the district court, which had used a balancing test to decide
that the city of Memphis must waive its attorney-client privilege, the Sixth
Circuit stated:
The district court's reasoning renders any municipality's privilege
dependent on ex post litigation choices made by its employees .... As
the Supreme Court has warned, "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which
purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the
courts, is little better than no privilege at all." Making the City's ability
to invoke attorney-client privilege contingent on litigation choices made
by one of its former employees renders the privilege intolerably
uncertain. 92
Even if current doctrine did hold that a defendant's constitutional right to
mount a defense could prevail over a third party's attorney-client privilege, this
doctrine would only provide a solution for criminal cases. The Court's rulings
in this area have been grounded in the constitutional provisions governing
defendants' rights in criminal trials. A constitutional right to present the
evidence necessary to mount a defense in civil cases has never been
recognized. 93 If the Court did recognize such a right in both criminal and civil
89. Id. at 410; see id. at 409 ("Balancing expost the importance of the information against client
interests, even limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial uncertainty into the
privilege's application. For just that reason, we have rejected use of a balancing test in
defining the contours of the privilege.").
go. Of course, this argument assumes that undermining the privilege in this way would be bad
for society, which is the stance taken by the Supreme Court. It leaves open the question of
whether there might ultimately be a net benefit in undermining the privilege to vindicate a
defendant's right to mount a full defense.
91. Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F. 3d 596 (6th Cir. 2005).
92. Id. at 603-04 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
93. Professor lrnwinkelried argues provocatively that there should be a due process right to
present the evidence necessary for a defense in civil cases as well. Edward J. Imwinkelried,
435
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
trials, this would not be the end of the inquiry. We would still need to know
how a balancing test would be applied. Courts would have to balance the third-
party corporation's interest (which may also be a proxy for society's interest in
maintaining the attorney-client privilege) with the defendant's interest in
presenting her defense. Scholars have generally floundered in attempts to
suggest an appropriate test. 94
Any balancing test solution will also leave in place most of the agency costs
associated with unpredictability in litigation and judicial error. If the court
balances the interests in favor of the defendant, the corporation will bear the
risk of uncertain attorney-client privilege and the associated litigation
uncertainty. If the court balances the interests in favor of the corporation, the
defendant director bears the increased risk associated with higher liability. The
fact that such tests are highly fact-specific and prone to inconsistent results and
judicial error means that neither party can predict which way the court would
balance the interests, further increasing litigation uncertainty. 9s
Moreover, these solutions will do little to internalize the uncertainty and
error costs borne by society. Any time a court holds that the corporation's
privilege should outweigh the defendant's interest, society will continue to bear
substantial costs in the form of litigation uncertainty for the plaintiff or
prosecution. In civil fraud cases, the public may also bear the risk of being
unable to recover taxpayer money if it was fraudulently obtained by a director
who had the requisite scienter.
In conclusion, applying an ex post balancing test, like piercing the privilege
or using a motion in limine, increases agency costs by increasing uncertainty.
All three approaches also threaten to eviscerate the attorney-client privilege and
therefore are not effective solutions to the impasse.
Questioning the Behavioral Assumption Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of
Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 145, 168-69 (2004).
94. The balancing tests advanced by other scholars invariably result in a case-by-case
determination of which interest will prevail, creating a high risk of litigation uncertainty and
judicial error. More critically, the proponents of these tests often concede that they do not
create a satisfying solution when the particular privilege implicated is the attorney-client
privilege. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, The Right To Present a Defense: An Emergent
Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 711, 815-8o (1976); Welsh S.
White, Criminal Law: Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant's Constitutional Right To
Introduce Evidence, 8o J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377, 414-16 (1989).
9s. Were a court to implement a procedure like the one required in Grace II, in which the
defense must request a waiver on a document-by-document basis as the trial progresses, the
uncertainty factor would increase enormously: not only would each party be uncertain
going into trial as to the strength of its case, but it would have to wonder from day to day
during the trial whether it would be permitted to present (or investigate) individual
materials.
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C. Ex Ante Solutions
Ex ante solutions tend to generate more efficient results because they allow
the parties to anticipate future litigation and allocate risks and costs among
themselves. These solutions include altering the relationships between the
parties and their lawyers or contracting to waive the privilege under certain
circumstances. Particularly when contracting occurs, the parties will tend to
collaborate to lower costs and thereby increase the contractual surplus.
Contemplation of future litigation costs also encourages a reduction in
externalities, as parties become more aware ex ante of the costs associated with
possible future decisions.6
i. Multiple Clients or Multiple Lawyers
One ex ante solution is to consider the director and the corporation as joint
clients of the same counsel. If both parties are clients, each has an equal right to
waive the privilege notwithstanding the objections of the other. This approach,
called "joint client privilege," has been applied consistently by federal courts in
other settings. Under current doctrine, however, the standards to establish a
joint client privilege are extremely high.97 For example, Odmark v. Westside
Bancorporation, Inc. adopted the following test for establishing joint client
privilege: "If [the director] makes it clear when he is consulting the company
lawyer that he personally is consulting the lawyer and the lawyer sees fit to
accept and give communication knowing the possible conflicts that could arise,
he may have a privilege" that both he and the company would have
independent authority to waive.98 Thus, a joint client privilege would be
difficult to establish in practice without significant change to the doctrine.
Even if the bar to establish joint client privilege were lowered, the solution
is problematic. It is likely to lead to conflicts of interest and increased
transaction costs, as corporate counsel would constantly be advising two clients
96. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 347, 348 (1967) (defining externalities as the effects of contracting parties' actions on
others or themselves that have not been brought to bear on the decisions of at least one of
the contracting parties).
97. See, e.g., Odmark v. Westside Bancorporation, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 552, 555-56 (W.D. Wash.
1986); see also Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1196 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that
when the trustee and directors of a corporation hold a joint privilege, the trustee's waiver
does not bar the directors from asserting their individual privileges in other proceedings).
98. 636 F. Supp. at 555-56 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 (E.D.
Mich. 1977), aqL'd, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978)).
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whose interests were not fully aligned. The attorney might have to give two
sets of advice when the law applies differently to corporations and directors.
For example, to violate the False Claims Act, a defendant must have knowledge
that the claim submitted to the government is false. 99 A corporate agent's
knowledge may be imputed to the corporation,' but the corporation's
knowledge may not necessarily be imputed to any individual agent.'' It is
easier, then, to prove that a corporation had knowledge than that an individual
director had knowledge.
More critically, frequent use of joint client privilege would eventually
eviscerate the corporate attorney-client privilege. If a director is personally a
joint client with the corporation, she has waiver rights regarding legal advice
given to her under the joint client agreement that cannot be restricted to her
term of employment. If every director is a joint client with the corporation,
then each director will have the power to waive the corporation's privilege,
even after she has left the firm, whether or not she needs to raise an advice of
counsel defense. Because director turnover is inevitable in a going concern,
regular use of joint client privilege would mean that a corporation's attorney-
client privilege would be secure only to the extent that fiduciary duty could
prevent current directors from waiving the privilege when it was not in the
corporation's best interest.102
The second possible solution of this type would be to have each director
maintain individual counsel at all times, essentially bringing her own lawyer to
work. The increased transaction costs, not to mention logistical nightmares,
associated with this solution are immediately apparent. Even in current
practice, as soon as a company discovers it is under federal investigation for
fraud, it often hires outside counsel for itself and suggests to key directors that
they secure their own outside counsel. The various lawyers representing all the
parties immediately begin honing individualized strategies for their clients,
figuring out who needs to be "hung out to dry" so that their clients can come
99. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)()-( 3) (2000).
100. See, e.g., United States ex rel Quirk v. Madonna Towers, Inc., 278 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir.
2002) (examining the testimony of the chief administrator and chief financial officer to
determine whether the defendant corporation had sufficient knowledge of the falsehood).
lo. See, e.g., L.B. Indus., Inc. v. Smith, 817 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that to be held
personally liable for a corporate fraud, a director must have personal knowledge of, or
involvement in, the fraud).
102. This Note does not reach the question of what duties a fiduciary or agent owes to her
principal when both parties share a joint client privilege. It is sufficient for these purposes to
argue that were these duties the sole force for maintaining a corporation's attorney-client
privilege, the scope of the privilege would be significantly narrower and more uncertain
than under the current regime.
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out relatively unscathed. To import these kinds of tensions earlier into the
agency relationship could serve only to drive a wedge between the directors
and the corporation.
2. Contracting for Waiver of Privilege
The solution I propose is that the corporation should agree to waive its
attorney-client privilege with respect to specified legal opinions, but only if the
director is being sued in her individual capacity and needs to raise an advice of
counsel defense. This solution, which I term "contractual waiver of privilege,"
greatly reduces litigation uncertainty and judicial error costs for all parties. It
forces the agent and principal to internalize costs that are otherwise borne by
society in the form of unclear legal rules, prosecutorial ineffectiveness, and lost
taxpayer money.
In contrast to the other solutions I have explored, which would rely on
doctrinal change, the contractual waiver of privilege relies primarily on the
dealings of individual actors and entities. Accordingly, the proposed solution is
not one of reshaping the law, but rather of reshaping actors' choices within the
existing legal framework. In addition to being more practical to implement,
this solution is preferable to a balancing test or other ex post regimes in which
a judge may eventually force a corporation to waive its privilege because this
solution allows and encourages the parties to agree upon and control the
conditions and scope of the waiver.
Professors Robert Scott and George Triantis have argued that contract
design, including design of employment contracts, should be an opportunity
for parties to anticipate future litigation. °3 Parties can reduce their back-end
costs (i.e., litigation costs that include the gathering of exculpatory evidence,
litigation uncertainty, and judicial error) by investing more at the front end (at
the time of formation) and by contracting for measures that reduce future
litigation costs.1"4 Scott and Triantis suggest that the time of contracting
should be a time for the parties to anticipate "who is more likely to be suing
and for what."'0' Directors can anticipate that they are likely to be sued in
connection with decisions that in hindsight have adverse consequences. Thus,
a director negotiating her employment package can contract to reduce the cost
103. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J.
814, 878 (2006).
104. Id. at 818-19. Scott and Triantis discuss contractual provisions designed to reduce litigation
costs between the parties to the contract. I extend their argument to anticipating litigation
arising out of the contract between one of the contracting parties and a third party.
105. Id. at 878.
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to her of getting the exculpatory evidence in future litigation. She can secure
the company's promise to waive its attorney-client privilege under limited
circumstances.
Although at first glance this solution might appear to require the director to
forfeit some monetary compensation in consideration of the agreement to
waive privilege, this is not the likely outcome. The contractual waiver of
privilege will enable the director to make more aggressive decisions. By taking
on more risk for the corporation, the director is likely to increase its overall
returns.1" 6 Thus, by agreeing to waive its privilege under very limited
circumstances, the firm can experience a marginal surplus from the director-
corporation employment contract that makes the design of the contract rational
for both parties.
III. CONTRACTING SOLUTIONS IN DEPTH
The previous Part demonstrated the potential advantages of contractual
waivers of privilege between the corporation and its director. This Part now
develops the suggestion in detail, first showing that a contractual waiver is
enforceable, and then developing a theory of which legal rules concerning the
waivers should be defaults and which should be mandatory. Finally, this Part
begins to explore how such provisions might be structured.
A. Are Contractual Waivers of Privilege Enforceable?
The first question that arises when considering the feasibility of contractual
waivers of privilege is whether courts would enforce such provisions. Recent
Supreme Court cases indicate that the Court would be likely to do so in both
criminal and civil cases.
United States v. Mezzanatto0 7 concerned whether a criminal defendant may,
in a contract prior to trial, waive the evidentiary rule that statements made in
106. This argument suggests that directors will raise the firm's risk-taking from its current level
to the shareholders' desired level. The corporation's actual current risk level reflects the
shareholders' desired level minus the amount of risk that directors refuse to take on for fear
of personal liability. The difference between the desired risk level and the actual risk level is
one way to measure the agency cost associated with the impasse. See supra Section II.A. The
contractual waiver of privilege reduces this cost by making the personal risk a director faces
for a given decision more similar to the risk the corporation faces for the same conduct
(because the director can raise the advice of counsel defense as easily as the corporation can).
107. 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
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the course of plea discussions are inadmissible against the defendant."°" The
Court, in a 7-2 decision, gave an emphatic "yes." The Court stated, "A criminal
defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most
fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution."' ° Although the Court
did not mention attorney-client privilege, the Court cited precedents that
expressly allowed waiver of the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and
the right to counsel.'10 The Court also held that evidentiary rules are
presumptively waivable and that courts have "'liberally enforced' agreements to
waive various exclusionary rules of evidence" ' because "evidentiary
stipulations are a valuable and integral part of everyday trial practice. Prior to
trial, parties often agree in writing to the admission of otherwise objectionable
evidence, either in exchange for stipulations from opposing counsel or for
other strategic purposes .....
The Court specifically addressed the concern that enforcing such a waiver
would create a "chilling effect" on the plea bargaining process by making
defendants "think twice" before speaking candidly in plea bargaining."3 The
Court stated that this potential cost was offset by the fact that enforcing the
waivers would facilitate plea bargaining when, without such a waiver
agreement in place, the prosecution would be unwilling to move forward with
the negotiation."1 4 In other words, contractual waivers of evidentiary privileges
should be permitted because they allow parties to transact more efficiently and
thereby improve the functioning of the legal system. This holding, and its
underlying policy endorsing the waiver of evidentiary rights in a criminal trial
(in which defendants' rights are most salient), appears highly applicable to the
question of enforceability of ex ante contractual waivers of attorney-client
privilege between the corporation and its directors.
The Mezzanatto Court placed two limitations on its broad holding. The first
was that "[t] here may be some evidentiary provisions that are so fundamental
to the reliability of the factfinding process that they may never be waived
without irreparably 'discredit[ing] the federal courts.'..'. While one could
108. FED. R. EVID. 41o. At the time of the case, this rule was codified at FED. R. CRiM. P. n1(e)(6).
iog. Mezzanato, 513 U.S. at 201.
110. Id.
iii. Id. at 202.
112. Id. at 203.
113. Id. at 206 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id. at 207.
115. Id. at 204 (second alteration in original).
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construe this limiting language to include attorney-client privilege, the Court's
decision set the standard for such a fundamentally unenforceable provision far
higher: its example of an unenforceable contractual waiver was one in which
the parties stipulated to trial by a jury of twelve orangutans. '6 Moreover, the
Court distinguished between agreements that deprive the courts of relevant
testimony and agreements that allow admission of evidence that would
otherwise be excluded; the latter are strongly favored and likely to be
enforced. "7 An ex ante contractual waiver of privilege between a director and
her corporation would be just such an agreement. The Court's second
limitation was that the waiver in question would be enforceable only "absent
some affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly
or involuntarily."", 8 This limitation is unlikely to pose a problem in the
corporate context because sophisticated parties such as a candidate director and
a corporation are generally presumed to have bargained knowingly and
voluntarily.
The Court has also enforced ex ante contractual waivers of constitutional
due process rights in civil litigation. In D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., the
Court held that a debtor could waive its right to jury trial through a cognovit
action, whereby it agrees at the time the debt is negotiated that if it does not
pay the balance on the maturity date, judgment will be entered against it." 9
Under such a cognovit action, the debtor also waives the rights to trial, to raise
any and all defenses, and to appeal the judgment. The Court held that such
agreement was not a per se violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause and that the only factor that affected its constitutionality was
whether the parties were of equal bargaining power and contracting
sophistication. 2 °  Since Overmyer, the Court has continually enforced
predispute contractual waivers of due process rights, including arbitration
clauses and forum selection clauses, as long as contract law standards of
consent are satisfied.12'
116. Id. (citing United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7 th Cir. 1985)).
117. Id. at 204-05.
118. Id. at 210.
119. 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972).
12o. Id. at 187-88.
121. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers
of Constitutional Rights, LAw & CONTEMp. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 167. Judge Posner
has argued that courts tend to enforce contractual waivers of important trial rights and that
these contracts should be enforceable because they allow parties to reduce litigation
uncertainties. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEx. L.
REV. 1581, 1595 (2005).
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B. The Corporation's Incentives
The next consideration is whether corporations would be amenable to such
agreements. The contractual waiver does present a cost to the corporation,
particularly given that once attorney-client privilege has been waived with
respect to a document in a particular lawsuit, that document cannot be shielded
from discovery in future suits.'22 However, three factors should incentivize the
corporation to invest in a contractual waiver of privilege: efficiency gains from
the waiver that will increase net value to the firm, the need to recruit talented
directors, and pressure created by directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance
companies.
As I discussed in Section I.A, the costs associated with contractual waiver
are an investment by the corporation, a form of bonding cost designed to align
the director's interests with those of the shareholders. The contractual waiver
of privilege reduces the personal risk that the director faces to equal the risk
that the corporation faces. Agency theory predicts that corporations will bear
the cost of the contractual waiver of privilege if it results in a net increase in
value to the firm. '23 By restoring the risk level faced by the director to the
relatively lower level faced by the corporation, shareholders will ensure that the
risks taken by the director are commensurate with the risk level they desire for
their investment, thus improving the likelihood that returns will meet their
expectations. 4 Moreover, in an efficient market, information that the firm has
now decreased the risk faced by its directors, thus providing incentives for the
directors to make optimally aggressive decisions,'25 should result in an increase
in stock price to anticipate the rise in future cash flows generated by this
12z. GERGACZ, supra note "1, 5.01, at 5-3 to -6.
123. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 65, at 325-26.
124. See Romano, supra note 67, at 4 (arguing that shareholders want "to ensure that directors
take the desired level of risk, as they might otherwise be too cautious for fear of the potential
liability for a decision that proves harmful with hindsight").
125. The optimal level of risk is defined as the level of risk that the shareholders desire the
corporation to take. Whatever the optimal level, under the current regime, the director will
take less risk than is optimal -making lower-risk decisions to offset the higher personal risk
she faces. The contractual waiver of privilege restores the level of risk the director is willing
to take back up to the optimal level. If shareholders believe one of their directors is taking on
too much risk, they have two options. They can diversify their portfolio by investing in other
companies, or they can exercise their voting rights and have the director replaced. The
uncertainty associated with the impasse is far less reliable as a way to rein in overly risky
directors than either of these two options and moreover is not tailored to manage only the
overly risky directors.
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investment (i.e., the waiver agreement).12 6 Thus, firms would have a near-term
financial incentive to invest in waiver to see net growth in firm value.
The strong negotiating position of the directors they are trying to recruit
should also incentivize firms to agree to contractual waivers of privilege. Firms
generally believe that there is a tight market for high-quality directors and will
make substantial economic investments to recruit them. Evidence of this
includes the high pay extracted by new directors, 127 as well as a history of
corporate investment in other costs that reduce directors' personal liability,
including the purchase of D&O insurance and the adoption of charter
provisions that limit directors' personal liability.2 Thus, while the cost of
contractual waiver is real, firms are likely to bear it to recruit directors to join
the firm.
Finally, D&O insurers will put pressure on corporations to contract for
conditional waiver." 9 D&O insurers have two primary incentives to encourage
such waivers. The first is that insurers generally attempt to reduce litigation
uncertainties in order to correctly price premiums and evaluate settlement
offers. 3 ' A contractual waiver would significantly reduce the litigation
uncertainties associated with the impasse. The second incentive is to make sure
that charges that a director has engaged in fraud or deceitful practice are
adjudicated on the merits. This is because D&O insurance policies generally
exclude coverage for fraud claims, but in most states this exclusion only applies
126. See STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 362-76 (3d ed. 1993); cf. Bengt
Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United
States: Making Sense of the 198os and 199os, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 20Ol, at 121, 134-35 (citing
empirical evidence that institutional investors play an important role in current capital
markets, monitor firms closely, and will pay a premium for companies with good corporate
governance).
127. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Outside Advice on Boss's Pay May Not Be So Independent, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1O, 20o6, at At (noting that defenders of director compensation say it reflects
the "increasingly complex and competitive arena" for directors).
128. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 1o2(b)( 7 ) (2004) (permitting charter amendments); Alfred F.
Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DuKE L.J. 895, 898-
900 (arguing that directors will not serve unless protected from personal liability);
Romano, supra note 67, at 1-2, 4 (noting that many directors will not serve without D&O
insurance).
129 . See TORT & INS. PRACTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS'N, DIRECToRs AND OFFICERS LIABILITY
INSURANCE DESKBOOK 11 (David E. Bordon et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter D&O DESKBOOK]
(stating that insurers have freedom at the time a policy is drafted to determine the contours
of the policy and to ensure profitability and predictability).
13o. D&O insurance policies generally require the insured to obtain the insurer's prior consent to
any settlement, and the insured has a duty to cooperate with the insurer by providing it with
sufficient information on which to evaluate the proposed settlement. Id. at 151.
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after the fraud has been successfully adjudicated. A settlement that does not
stipulate to fraud does not trigger the fraud exclusion.' 3 ' To the extent that a
risk-averse director (or plaintiff), unable to present (or discredit via cross-
examination) an advice of counsel defense, may be overly tempted to settle and
thus avoid an adjudication of fraud, insurance companies may be forced to
cover claims they would otherwise hope to exclude under the fraud exception.
Thus, insurance companies have incentives to pressure corporations to contract
for conditional waiver, and they can apply this pressure in two ways. They can
use their right to "assist in the litigation" to demand the practice outright,"32 or
they can simply increase premiums for those corporations that refuse to
contract for waiver.
33
C. Default and Mandatory Rules
Having addressed the threshold questions of enforceability and corporate
amenability, this Note now analyzes which legal rules should be defaults that
the parties may contract around and which should be mandatory."' As a
preliminary step, it is important to note that we are allocating not one, but two
sets of risks. On the one hand, we are allocating between a director and a
corporation the risks associated with making management decisions. The rule
as between these two parties should be a default that parties may contract
around. The parties are entering into an agency relationship. In settings like
131. See id. at 121-23; Marc Mayerson, What a Director (or Officer) Wants: A Guide for Insureds to
the Wordings of D&O Policies, Insurance Scrawl, Feb. 11, 2006,
http://www.insurancescrawl.com/archives/20o6/o2/whats-a-directo.html.
132. D&O policies traditionally do not impose a duty to defend on the insurer. However, the
policies frequently give the insurer a right to "associate in the defense" of the insured. D&O
DESKBOOK, supra note 129, at 1oo-ol; Christopher W. Martin, Director and Officer Insurance,
Hous. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 38, available at http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com!
aa-maro4/aa-feature/page38/page38.htm. There are some examples of insurers requiring
the insured to waive certain procedural protections ex ante. See, e.g., Mayerson, supra note
131 (discussing a policy that required the insured to waive the protection of an automatic
stay in bankruptcy).
133. D&O insurers evaluate a corporation's "corporate governance" as a factor in determining
premiums. See, e.g., Corporate Legal Times & Foley & Lardner LLP, D&O Insurance: What
Directors Want, and Where the Market Is Heading 37 (June 16, 2005),
http://www.foley.conm/fies/tbls88EventMaterials/FileUpload587/3 52/D&0%201nsurance.
PPT#258; PAUL HOPKIN, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE GUIDANCE AND
ADVICE FOR RISK MANAGERS 8-9 (2004), http://www.airmic.com/Spd/Downiladfiles/
ALRMIC D and-O-guide.pdf.
134. This task is admittedly the most difficult. Cf Scott & Triantis, supra note 103, at 857 ("We
have been hard pressed, however, to find scholarly treatises on procedure or evidence that
identify the subset of these rules that are default rather than mandatory provisions.").
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director recruitment, in which the parties are sophisticated and have strong
bargaining positions, allowing them to bargain over the terms enables them to
allocate the risks associated with decision-making in the way that both parties
believe is optimal for the relationship. 3
On the other hand, by allowing directors to contract for waiver of a
corporation's rights in litigation, we are also allocating the risks between a
defendant and plaintiff, unknown at the time of contract, that critical evidence
(in the form of the legal opinions relied upon) will be undiscoverable at trial.
This allocation of risk is involuntary for at least one party because there is no
plaintiff with whom the director may contract ex ante. Therefore the legal rule
governing their relations should be mandatory.
1. Default Rules
Looking first at the default rule between the director and corporation, if the
default were that a corporate director could presumptively waive all materials
she has viewed (meaning that she could authorize the waiver of the
corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to those documents), it
would place a burden on corporations to contract to make documents
nonwaivable every time a legal opinion is sought. This rule places the burden
on the party most likely to know the law and to be able to manage its privilege
proactively. However, this default would add greatly to the transaction costs
accompanying every consultation with counsel and every major business
decision, as the corporation would have to contract to make each opinion
nonwaivable every time. Further adding to the costs would be the risk that in
the event of litigation, ambiguities in a contract to make the counsel's opinion
nonwaivable would be construed against the corporation. Corporations would
forever have to worry that a poorly drawn contract could lead to an inadvertent
waiver concerning documents that the corporation had intended to keep
privileged."36 From a doctrinal perspective, we might say that this default could
135. This proposition is supported by the observation that director employment is largely
unregulated today. The corporation's decisions about the terms of a director's contract are
protected by the business judgment rule. E.g., Brehm v. Eisner, No. 41, 2006 Del. LEXIS
307, at *79-8o (June 8, 20o6). As long as there is no element of self-dealing, if the existing
board follows a standard of reasonable care in negotiating the new director's contract, even
if it fails to follow "best practices," the court will not substitute its judgment as to the actual
substance of the contract for that of the board. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., Consolidated C. A. No. 15452, 20o5 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *7-8 (Aug. 9, 2005), affid,
Brehm, 20o6 Del. LEXIS 307.
136. Note that Mezzanatto specifically stated that a pretrial contract to waive an evidentiary
privilege is enforceable only absent an indication that the agreement was entered into
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eviscerate the privilege. Under Supreme Court cases such as Upjohn and
Weintraub, which consider the attorney-client privilege fundamental to the
successful functioning of the legal system,'37 the default of "presumptively
waivable" simply would not stand.'
3 8
Therefore, the default should be that the corporation holds the attorney-
client privilege on all communications with its attorney,' 39 even if the director
must rely on the opinion to make management decisions. The director could
then contract to obtain the corporation's agreement to waive its privilege with
respect to those documents relied upon if the director, sued in her individual
capacity, needs to raise an advice of counsel defense. Doctrinally, this default is
satisfying in that it closely embodies the current law of attorney-client privilege
and allows the corporation to determine the conditions under which it will
waive.
This default could present a cost in that it may create a trap for the unwary
or uninformed director who does not know the state of privilege law or who
may be unable to understand the kinds of communications for which she
should negotiate waivability. For example, in the healthcare context, the
Medicare laws are highly complex, and the definition of what may constitute a
false claim under the False Claims Act is broad and unintuitive.1 4 ' A director
would need to take great care to secure waivability for the right opinions.
However, if the practice of contractual waiver becomes widespread, a
reasonable director should be able to anticipate the need to contract for waiver
and could perhaps consult a personal attorney at the time of the employment
contract to assist in the analysis. Similarly, D&O insurers are likely to rapidly
"unknowingly or involuntarily." United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995). If a
corporation's attempt to make a certain opinion nonwaivable failed due to an imperfection
in the contract, the corporation could argue that it had thereby been forced to leave an
opinion waivable "unknowingly or involuntarily." Therefore, in addition to the problems
listed above, a "presumptively waivable" regime might also be unconstitutional under
Mezzanatto.
137. See supra Section I.B.
138. Cf. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998) (rejecting even a minor
exception carved out of the attorney-client privilege rule that applied only to
communications by a deceased witness in a criminal trial, because it would introduce
"substantial uncertainty" into the privilege's application).
139. Subject, of course, to the normal constraints on what documents qualify as privileged. See
supra note ii.
140. For example, the False Claims Act creates an action for "reverse false claims," in which the
defendant "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement
to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government." 31 U.S.C. S 3729(a) (7) (2000); see United States ex rel. Taylor v. Gabelli, 345
F. Supp. 2d 313, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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aggregate information on what types of communications should be made
waivable and to communicate this to the director or the corporation. 141 These
costs are surmountable, and given the practical evisceration of privilege that
would result from a presumptively waivable default, the presumptively
nonwaivable default is the preferable regime.
2. Mandatory Rules
Although the default of nonwaivability encourages efficient allocation of
management decision-making risks between the director and corporation, this
default would in some cases create an unsatisfactory externality for the
plaintiff: the risk that the defendant director and corporation have not made
any agreement as to waiver of privilege would fall on the plaintiff, leaving her
unable to discover the relevant legal opinions.
In a new regime in which contractual waivers of privilege are the norm,
there would be a few scenarios in which the plaintiff could face discovery with
a director and corporation who have not previously contracted for waiver of
privilege. One possibility is that a particularly recalcitrant corporation has
refused to make any concession to the director. Another possibility is that a
self-professed "bargain-basement" director has purposefully opted not to
extract such a conditional waiver agreement in order to market herself more
cheaply to the corporation; she is willing to take her chances at trial. A third
possibility is that the corporation and director have colluded not to waive
privilege to exploit the uncertainties of trial and perhaps play "cooperative
party, uncooperative party." The director may give the impression that she
dearly wishes to cooperate with the plaintiff and provide the legal opinions but
that her hands are tied because the corporation is refusing to cooperate and
waive the privilege. 142 Although the first of these scenarios reveals a more
sympathetic defendant than the other two, the fact that the costs are being
externalized onto the plaintiff suggests that we need another rule in the system
to allocate the risks.
The court has two choices with regard to a defendant who wishes to assert
an advice of counsel claim but has not secured a waiver. The first option is to
allow the defendant to mention at trial that she relied in good faith on the
141. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text for more on the role of D&O insurers.
142. In Grace II, the government even argued that Grace and its former directors had colluded
and agreed that Grace would vigorously refuse to waive privilege to induce the court to
grant a severed trial. 439 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1144 (D. Mont. 2006). The court did not accept
this argument, although it stated that it believed the arguments related to privilege might
have been "manufactured" to make a case for severability. Id. at 1144 n.18.
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advice of corporate counsel, and then to allow the corporation's attorney-client
privilege to bar any further examination or cross-examination on that claim
(the "mentionable" rule).'43 The second option is to forbid the defendant even
to mention the advice of counsel claim during trial by granting the plaintiff a
motion in limine to exclude all such evidence (the "unmentionable" rule)." To
adopt the mentionable rule would allow the director to externalize most of the
costs associated with the impasse onto the plaintiff and public. Allowing the
defendant to mention that she relied in good faith on the advice of corporate
counsel without requiring her to present proof that the opinion was reasonable
and that her reliance was in good faith is simply an invitation to the jury to
allow sympathy to manipulate the decision-making process. The prospect of a
mentionable rule would also provide fewer incentives for the director and
corporation to contract for a conditional waiver of privilege, particularly among
those who are willing to skimp on front-end contracting costs in the hopes of
saving at the back end. (They may believe that the risk of being sued is low or
that they may benefit from jury sympathy in a mentionable regime.) Therefore,
the most efficient rule is to make the advice of counsel claim unmentionable.
This rule must be mandatory, as there is no way ex ante for the director to
contract with a future plaintiff.
One possible alternative is for the rule to be unmentionable in civil trials
and mentionable in criminal trials. This approach might accord with the notion
that in criminal trials the defendant deserves the utmost opportunity to defend
herself.4 ' A firmer grounding for this two-tiered approach might be found in
the fact that the plaintiff's burden of proof is different in criminal trials than in
civil trials. As discussed in Section I.A, the advice of counsel claim is not an
affirmative defense but a category of evidence presented to controvert an
element of the plaintiff's prima facie case. In a criminal trial, the prosecution
must prove the element of knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the
defendant can raise a reasonable doubt as to her state of mind by mentioning
that she was relying in good faith on the advice of corporate counsel, a jury
should be entitled to consider this assertion (and the defendant's credibility) in
143. Cross-examination would be barred on the grounds that it would require the defendant to
reveal information about privileged communications, if not the contents of the
communications themselves.
14. For more information on the motion in limine, see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying
text.
145. Note, however, that while the Constitution does create stronger rights to defend oneself at
criminal trial than civil trial, see supra Subsection I1.B. 3, these rights are not strong enough
to prevail over a third party's attorney-client privilege. The approach analyzed in this
paragraph is grounded in a "sense of fairness" as opposed to explicit constitutional rights.
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deciding whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof on the element of
knowledge.
While there is some intuitive appeal to this two-tiered approach, it is
ultimately problematic. This approach does little more than allow the director
and corporation to externalize their agency costs in criminal trials but not civil
trials. Allowing a mentionable rule in criminal trials still invites the jury to
make uninformed decisions, as the jury will be expressly asked to make
determinations about assertions that have not been properly cross-examined.
These costs outweigh any benefit to giving directors more room to play to the
jury in criminal trials.
In conclusion, the analysis suggests that the appropriate rule should be a
mandatory rule that, absent an ex ante agreement for conditional waiver of
privilege, the advice of counsel claim should be completely unmentionable in
both civil and criminal trials. This rule will create a strong incentive for the
parties to contract and may therefore be seen as what Professor Ian Ayres calls a
"good kind of coercion."146 Because the proposed default and mandatory
regime falls squarely within longstanding Supreme Court doctrine and other
related case law and would not require overturning any cases, passing new
statutes, or changing the Federal Rules of Evidence, there are no legal
impediments to prevent corporations from implementing this solution
immediately.'47
D. The Terms of the Agreement
The core of the suggested solution lies in the interaction of two rules: the
default nonwaivable rule encouraging directors and corporations to contract
for conditional waivers of attorney-client privilege and the mandatory
unmentionable rule excluding evidence in the absence of such a contract. To
develop the solution more fully, this Section explores how a contractual waiver
of privilege might be structured.
The basic form of the provision would, of course, be the agreement that if
the director becomes a defendant in litigation, and if (and only if) the
defendant needs to raise the advice of counsel defense, the corporation will
agree to waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to the relevant
communications. The regime would not require that a corporation must agree
to waive or share its privilege without limit. Through contract, the corporation
146. Ian Ayres, First Amendment Bargains, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (SPEcIAL ISSUE) 178,195 (2006).
147. Mezzanatto in particular indicates that current law allows and encourages predispute
waivers, as the rules of evidence are presumptively waivable. See supra notes 107-112 and
accompanying text.
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can determine both the scope of the waiver and the conditions under which it
will waive. To manage the substantive scope of waiver, the corporation should
contract to waive the privilege as narrowly as possible. The corporation and
director could agree on a process in advance to identify waivable opinions or
communications. For example, they could create a list of criteria based on the
business process of the corporation that, if met, would render a document
waivable.
In addition to substantive scope, the parties could also negotiate to limit
the occasions on which the privilege would be waived. The parties might set
forth other defenses that a director must exhaust prior to raising an advice of
counsel defense. The agreement might also create more bars to waiver in a civil
suit than in a criminal suit, in which the prospect of criminal fines or
imprisonment makes the right to mount a defense more salient. For example,
with documents that are particularly sensitive, the corporation might contract
that the director will not raise the advice of counsel defense in a future civil suit
in exchange for full indemnification if she is found liable, while permitting the
director to raise the defense if necessary in a criminal suit.
The parties might stipulate to the procedure of in camera review to screen
out cases in which the defendant director's advice of counsel defense is so weak
that the defense is not really necessary. In camera review is not considered a
waiver of attorney-client privilege 14' 8 and so could be a safe way to allow a court
to review the opinion and determine if the advice of counsel defense is viable
without creating an involuntary waiver of privilege.
The court could review in camera the legal opinion and evidence of
whether the director did rely on the opinion in good faith and could sort the
evidence into three categories that would be treated differently. One category
would be evidence that is sufficiently clear as a matter of law for the judge to
make a determination on the advice of counsel defense without taking the
question to a jury. The court could render a partial summary judgment on the
issue, avoiding a situation in which the corporation has to waive the privilege
at trial. For example, if the judge, upon reviewing the legal opinion, could
determine that as a matter of law the opinion itself was unreasonable (and
therefore not exculpatory), then the defense would fail as a matter of law.
There would be no need to waive the privilege on this opinion and present it to
a jury.149
148. See, e.g., In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 8o5 F.2d 12o, 125 (3 d Cir.
1986).
149. Some elements of a case that involve mixed issues of law and fact may be properly ruled on
by a judge without abrogating a defendant's Seventh Amendment jury trial right. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3 d 1453, 146o (4 th Cir.
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The second category would be evidence that is either so weak or so
irrelevant that the judge can determine as a matter of law that the defendant
has not averred a strong enough defense to merit its inclusion at trial. This
would be something like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on an affirmative defense or
counter-defense. The corporation and director could agree that in this case, the
corporation will not waive the privilege and the director will drop this
argument from her defense. This category would protect corporations from
being forced to waive privilege when the director is grasping at straws and
raising frivolous defenses -for example, if the plaintiffs cause of action does
not include an element of scienter"'5
The final category would be evidence that presents a material issue of fact
that warrants a jury trial on whether the defendant's purported good faith
reliance on corporate counsel's advice negated the requisite scienter for
culpability. In this case, the corporation would execute its waiver and permit
the director to make the defense at trial. By using in camera review in this
manner, corporations can limit their waiver of privilege to those circumstances
in which there is a true material issue of fact regarding the director's good faith
reliance and in which the defense cannot otherwise be ruled upon as a matter
of law.
Of course, the benefit of a contract solution is that the parties can bargain
to customize the terms of the waiver of privilege in ways that anticipate the
unique needs of their agency relationship. As corporations and directors first
attempt to put the proposed solution into practice, there will be an increase in
the costs associated with litigation uncertainty and judicial error as the parties
create new contract provisions that have yet to be interpreted by courts.
However, as courts confront these provisions more frequently and set out clear
interpretations of the clauses, a body of precedent will build up that will enable
the next contracting parties to create provisions that are more reliable and less
susceptible to opportunistic litigation."'1 Over time, the costs associated with
1997). For each element in the plaintiff's prima facie case, there is a threshold issue of
whether the case is so weak that no jury could credit it, in which case a judge may properly
rule on the element without abrogating the right to jury trial. Id. (citing United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 516 (1995)). Also, parties may agree by contract to allow a judge to
conduct an in camera review and rule on some issues as a matter of law, even if this
agreement ultimately functions as a contractual waiver of jury trial rights. See Ware, supra
note 121, at 169 (demonstrating that courts permit parties to waive jury trial rights through
contract).
1SO. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
151. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261, 286-88 (1985)
(describing the process by which contractual provisions are developed and tested and
ultimately achieve legal recognition through consistent interpretations by the courts).
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the implementation of this solution will drop.' 2 From an ex ante perspective,
then, despite the initial unpredictability that could surround the creation of the
new contractual waiver provisions, the transition costs are surmountable, and
this undertaking will be rational in the long run."5 3
The brief exploration in this Section has not by any means exhausted the
range of possibilities for the contractual waiver of privilege. What it has
demonstrated is that the parties can successfully customize these provisions to
tailor the scope and circumstances of waiver.
CONCLUSION
The scenario suggested by this Note implicates core theoretical issues
concerning the right to defend oneself and the fundamental value of the
attorney-client privilege to our legal system. It also raises a question that is
timely and immensely practical. Anecdotal evidence suggests that cases such as
these have arisen with some regularity and have the potential to arise in the
future for almost any corporation.
As this Note has shown, the impasse created at the time of litigation can be
understood as a result of agency costs that have not been properly managed ex
ante when the director and corporation enter into an agency arrangement.
These costs result in lower value to the firm, as the director will make
suboptimal decisions that lower her risk of personal liability to compensate for
her diminished ability to defend herself. The failure to manage these costs also
results in significant externalities in the form of unpredictability,
insurmountably high evidentiary costs, and, in civil fraud cases, lost taxpayer
money. Most of the possible solutions to this problem do little to lower the
agency costs because they do nothing to resolve the litigation uncertainty and
risk of judicial error inherent in the system. In particular, while there is some
appeal to the idea that a defendant's constitutional right to mount a defense
should sometimes prevail over the corporation's right to maintain its privilege,
attempts to solidify this doctrine ultimately lead to some form of balancing
152. Moreover, much of this cost is borne by society through the judicial system, which through
precedent can create a "publicly supplied contract law that contains efficient solutions to
common contracting problems." Schwartz & Scott, supra note 68, at 596. So, not only are
the costs minimal over time, but they are also subsidized by the public.
153. Those transition costs borne by early adopters (after the public subsidy is taken into
account, see supra note 152) could create some disincentives for any one firm to become the
first to implement the new contractual waiver regime. However, the pressure of the market
for talented directors and the pressure created by D&O insurers may help overcome initial
hesitation. See supra Section II1.B.
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test. Any balancing test inherently preserves the high cost of litigation
uncertainty and risk of judicial error while doing little to internalize
externalities.
A regime in which corporations and directors contract ex ante for
conditional waivers of the corporation's attorney-client privilege is the most
efficient because it lowers costs to all parties, adds net value to the firm, and
significantly internalizes externalities. As between the director and the
corporation, there should be a default rule that attorney-client communications
are privileged and that the parties are encouraged to contract around this
default in the form of ex ante waivers conditioned on specific circumstances. As
between the director and the plaintiff, who is unknown at the time the conduct
at issue is occurring, there should be a mandatory rule that, when the director
has not secured a waiver, the advice of counsel defense will be completely
unmentionable at trial. The parties can also work together to minimize the cost
to the corporation in the form of unnecessary waivers of privilege by limiting
both the scope of the promised waiver and the conditions upon which the
corporation will execute waiver. As corporations consider how they will
manage the costs and risks inherent in decision-making, taking precautions ex
ante to contract for waivers of privilege will pay off in substantial benefits to
the corporation, to the directors, and to society.
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